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British Naval Officer Henry Mowat helped coordinate three key British offen-
sives in Maine during the American Revolution: the dismantling of Fort Pownal
at the mouth of the Penobscot River; the burning of Falmouth; and the destruc-
tion of the Massachusetts Navy at Bagaduce (Castine). His reputation among
Maine people was forged in these dramatic events, but was it malice alone that
guided his actions? Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783, Maine
Historical Society Collections.
HENRY MOWAT: MISCREANT OF
THE MAINE COAST
BY LOUIS ARTHUR NORTON
This article follows the career of Captain Henry Mowat as he took charge
of operations for the British Navy off the Maine Coast during the Revo-
lutionary War. Mowat was involved in three decisive actions during this
time: the dismantling of Fort Pownall at the mouth of the Penobscot
River; the burning of Falmouth, or present-day Portland; and the defeat
of the Massachusetts naval expedition to the British-occupied Bagaduce
Peninsula on the eastern side of Penobscot Bay. The author asks the
question: did this British officer deserve his reputation among Mainers
as an “execrable monster?” Louis Arthur Norton is a professor emeritus
at the University of Connecticut Health Center in Farmington. Dr Nor-
ton has published extensively on maritime history topics, including a bi-
ography titled JOSHUA BARNEY: HERO OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
WAR AND 1812 by the Naval Institute Press in 2000. He received the
2002 and 2006 Gerald E. Morris Prize for maritime historiography from
the Mystic Seaport Museum.
M
ost chronicles of the Revolutionary War focus on the centers of
military conflict up and down the eastern seaboard, from the
Carolinas up through Boston and its environs, and on a scat-
tering of clashes along the colonial western frontier. Somewhat forgotten
is the fact that the vast coast of the eastern province of Massachusetts,
now the State of Maine, was the site of many small skirmishes and im-
portant military events. The most renowned were the rebel capture of
the armed British warship Margaretta at Machias and Benedict Arnold’s
attack on Quebec, which included an onerous march through the Maine
wilderness. Three other events involved a British naval lieutenant whom
some called, interchangeably, the “Villain of Falmouth,” “Mad Henry
Mowat,” or the “Execrable Monster.” Henry Mowat became, in the eyes
of his Maine contemporaries, the miscreant of the Revolutionary War.
Mowat spent most of his professional naval career on duty in the
Gulf of Maine, orchestrating first the dismantling of Fort Pownal and
the burning of Falmouth, both in 1775, and then the British naval de-
fense that upset the American Penobscot Expedition to Bagaduce (Cas-
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tine). In 1779 Mowat’s British commanders had given him orders to re-
press and hopefully eliminate revolutionary activity along the coast of
Massachusetts and especially on the Maine frontier. The burning of Fal-
mouth in 1775 was especially significant as a turning point in the War of
Independence. While this was an isolated event far from population cen-
ters to the south, the audacity of the bombardment and wanton destruc-
tion of Falmouth led to increased American support for the revolution-
ary cause. The later defeat of the Penobscot Expedition confirmed the
vulnerability of some of the American militia forces and called into
question the competence of a least one commander of the Continental
Navy. Mowat gained infamy in carrying out these duties, but there is ev-
idence that there may have been more to him than his image implies.
Was Mowat a vengeful miscreant, or a duty-bound naval officer operat-
ing within a narrow range of choice? Either way, his role in the history of
Revolutionary Maine is significant.
Lieutenant Mowat
Henry Mowat was born in Scotland in 1734 into a venerable naval
family. His father, Patrick Mowat, held the title of Captain of His Britan-
nic Majesty’s Ship Dolphin. Mowat had three brothers who also served in
the Royal Navy, two of whom were killed in action later in life. For his
part, Mowat received his lieutenant’s commission on January 22, 1759.
He later married and left one son, John Alexander, to carry on the
Mowat family tradition by entering the navy in 1804. Taller than most
men of the time, with an athleletic build and fair complexion, the
square-jawed, aquiline-nosed Mowat gained his first assignment as a
junior ship’s officer on HMS Baltimore. In 1764 he received his first
command of the eight-gun Canceaux, upon which he served for twelve
years. The Canceaux was a converted merchant ship assigned survey
work along the northeastern coast, its primary station being the Pis-
cataqua River adjacent to Portsmouth.1
Taken Captive at Falmouth 
The first shots of the American Revolutionary War were fired on
April 19, 1775, at Lexington and Concord, but even before the official
commencement of war, some communities targeted Tories in reaction to
British imperial policy. In 1774 Samuel Thompson of Brunswick, appar-
ently inspired by the Boston Tea Party of December 16, 1773, led an
armed mob of followers up and down the Kennebec River enforcing an
embargo against Great Britain. Thompson and his mob searched the
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merchant houses for Tories and tea in hopes of throwing both into the
river. This essentially stopped trade with the British merchants who sup-
plied many indispensable goods, with dire consequences for the Cum-
berland County seacoast towns.
In April 1775 royal authorities in Boston sent a naval ship to break
the local embargo and “to warn the Infatuated people of the Conse-
quences that will issue from detaining, or interfering with ... any of his
Majesties Loyal subjects in their lawful avocations.”2 Mowat’s Canceaux,
en route to Halifax, was diverted to Falmouth to maintain civil order.
The appearance of the armed warship in Falmouth harbor enraged
some members of the local authority.
The Canceaux’s presence created unusual tensions because news of
the battles at Lexington and Concord had recently reached Falmouth.
Upon learning of the Canceaux’s arrival, Thompson decided to resolve
the issue of enforcing the boycott, regardless of the wishes of Falmouth’s
town leaders. In early May, he and about fifty men entered Falmouth
“each with a small bough of Spruce in his hat, and having a spruce pole
with a green top on it as a standard.”3 The party detained Captain
Mowat, his ship’s surgeon, and the Reverend John Wiswall while Mowat
and his party were ashore negotiating with town officials. Apprehension
arose on both sides. Thompson was reluctant to give up his captives be-
cause he felt that “Divine Providence had thrown them into [my] hand.”
Chaos broke out in Falmouth when the Canceaux’s second-in-com-
mand ordered two blank rounds (some references suggest real rounds)
fired in the direction of the town as a warning to release Mowat.4
Frightened residents fled as town authorities implored Thompson
and his men to free Mowat. Complicating the delicate deliberations, ap-
proximately six hundred armed and undisciplined militiamen from
nearby Gorham, Cape Elizabeth, Scarborough, and Windham poured
into the town to harass Tories. Falmouth’s militia was unable to defend
the town, as many members had already left for Cambridge in response
to the call to join the Continental Army. The rest of the militia were pre-
occupied with the preservation of their own persons and property. Fal-
mouth was under an ominous British naval threat, overrun by a rag-tag
militia of neighboring fellow citizens, and held captive by Thompson’s
inopportune hostage-taking.
Sanity prevailed: Thompson released Mowat on parole, perhaps be-
cause he was not sure what else to do with the British captain.5 Accord-
ing to the eighteenth-century ethical code governing military parole,
Mowat agreed to the terms of his parole and was honor-bound to keep
Henry Mowat 
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Fort Pownal, erected at the mouth of the Penobscot River in 1759, became a 
focus of British concern as tensions mounted along the Maine Coast. In March
1775 Mowat and his crew removed the arms and munitions from the fort, and
in reprisal, American insurgents burned the blockhouse and filled in the moat.
Fort Pownal plans, Library of Congress; map from Sandra Gordon Olson, “The
Archaeology of Fort Pownall: A Military Outpost on the Maine Coast” (M.A.
thesis, University of Maine, 1984).
 
them. He was released to return to his ship, but was told to return ashore
in the morning to complete negotiations. Two prominent local moder-
ate Whigs, Enoch Freeman and Jedediah Preble, were held as a guarantee
of Mowat’s return.6 Around the time of the parole discussions, some
sailors took a small boat ashore to do laundry and, while there, they
overheard plans kill Mowat when he returned the next day.7 The sailors
reported the conversation to Mowat who decided that, since the people
of Falmouth were not living up to their agreement, he would break his
word. It was obviously too dangerous to honor the conditions of parole.
Local loyalists were embarrassed to learn why Mowat stayed aboard
the Canceaux and were concerned that as British citizens they were enti-
tled to the protection of the crown. They expressed this to Mowat in the
following statement: “we have been relieved by your Spited Conduct
from those Anxieties natural to Persons who are abnoxious [sic] to the
Enemies of our happy Constitution and by your courteous and kind be-
havior to all the Friends of Government flatter Ourselves with the pleas-
ing Prospect of a Continuance of your Protection. [We regret that you
are leaving us] prey to the Sons of rapine and lawless Violence.”8 The
Americans also feared reprisal if other ships of the Royal Navy heard of
the slight to one of their officers. The British lieutenant appeared to un-
derstand their concerns, and thus the citizens of Falmouth felt that they
had no reason to fear retribution.
After several days the Canceaux caught a retreating tide and sailed
into the Gulf of Maine, escorting a vessel carrying many of Falmouth’s
Tories to the temporary safety of Boston. On June 26, 1775, the Journal
of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress recorded an opinion from “the
committee appointed to consider the Conduct of Colonel Thompson, at
Falmouth with respect to Captain Mowat.” According to the committee,
Thompson’s conduct was “friendly to his country and the cause of lib-
erty.”9 On the other hand, it was perhaps Thompson’s annoying local
embargo and his seizure of a royal naval officer that prompted the
British command to consider a retaliation designed to intimidate a wa-
vering Maine coastal population and force them to submit to the au-
thority of King George III.
Tensions mounted along the New England coast. On June 12, a band
of the Sons of Liberty from Machias captured the armed Royal Navy ves-
sel Margaretta. In the attack, the vessel’s commander, Midshipman
James Moore, was killed. A few days later on June16, conflict broke out
in Boston, culminating in what would become known as the Battle of
Bunker Hill, the first major British and American ground action of the
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nascent war. At the same time, the Royal Navy was dismayed by a grow-
ing number of British supply ships captured by American privateers.
Some of the cargoes seized by the Americans contained ammunition
and military supplies intended for British arsenals in North America.
This confiscated war materiel was a boon for the ill-equipped Continen-
tal Army, and the privateer actions angered those in command of the
British naval forces in Boston and Halifax.10
On the Maine coast, these hostilities drew attention to Fort Pownal at
the mouth of the Penobscot River. The stockade fort was erected in May
1759 on the decree of Massachusetts Governor Thomas Pownal to pro-
tect the river from French and Indian threat. Soon afterward, the British
captured Quebec, ending France’s grip in North America. Fort Pownal no
longer had a military purpose, but for the next decade and a half it served
as a center for trade and settlement in the Penobscot region. On the eve of
the American Revolution, political tensions between the Tories and rebels
in the area was high. In March 1775 loyalist Colonel Thomas Goldthwait,
then in command of Fort Pownal, allowed Mowat and his men on the
Canceaux to remove the fort’s cannons and powder in order to keep them
out of insurgent hands.11 In retaliation, a regiment of American rebels
burned down the blockhouse and filled in the fort’s ditch-like moat to
prevent British reoccupation of the fort. The dismantling of Fort Pownal
was the first of three events that contributed to Mainers’ frustrations with
Henry Mowat and his role in the Revolution.
The continued interception of British supply ships angered Vice-
Admiral Samuel Graves, the commander of the British North Atlantic
fleet, who had only twenty-nine armed ships to patrol the coastline from
Nova Scotia to Florida – some 1,800 miles. Many of his vessels were
small, in disrepair, and short of men. During July, August, and Septem-
ber, Vice-Admiral Graves deployed his thinly stretched armada to cap-
ture or sink the schooner-privateers ranging this long, open coastline.
Frustrated by this formidable task, he decided to punish the rebellious
coastal towns and ordered his men to burn and, if necessary, loot sea-
ports from Machias to the North Shore ports outside Boston. Not only
did these outports shelter rebel privateers, but they also supplied them
with provisions, sails, and other vital gear. Captain Mowat had spent
more than a decade surveying the coast of New England on board the
Canceaux. He knew these waters and settlements better than most other
North American naval commanders. On October 6 Graves ordered
Mowat “to Chastise Marblehead, Salem, Newbury Port, Cape Anne Har-
bour, Portsmouth, Ipswich, Saco, and Falmouth in Casco Bay [and] You
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are to go to all the above Places as you can and make the most vigorous
Efforts to burn the Towns, and destroy the Shipping in the Harbours.” As
the rationale for dispatching armed vessels on this mission, Graves
noted that the four New England governments were in open rebellion
against the crown and that their privateers had captured several vessels,
incarcerating their crews and wounding or killing many of the “King’s
Subjects.”12 He instructed Mowat: “if possible first go to Cape Anne
where Rebels thought it proper to fire upon the Falcon and where they
took her Officers and Crew, and sent Prisoners in the Country.”13
Falmouth bombarded
Mowat obeyed his orders, but chose to attack Falmouth first rather
than ports on the North Shore. Many of the North Shore communities
were located near one another, and Mowat surmised that a large fire in
any of these towns would alert the militias in nearby towns to come to
the defense. In addition, the towns extended inland, where seaborne
cannon fire would cause minimal damage. He knew that Falmouth’s in-
habitants had clustered close together for protection from hostile Indian
incursions, making Falmouth an ideal target for a demoralizing bom-
bardment. In addition it was the place where he had been held captive
just a few months earlier, an insult to his station as a Royal Navy officer.
On the other hand, documentary evidence suggests that Mowat may
have thought that he could convince the citizens of Falmouth to pledge
their loyalty to the crown, give up armed resistance, and thus save them-
selves from Graves’s proclamation.
On October 16 a flotilla of four British warships appeared in Fal-
mouth Harbor. Most of the people of Falmouth regarded the squadron’s
presence as an unwelcome, but not unusual annoyance. British warships
had frequently confiscated livestock from the nearby islands and carried
off provisions to feed British troops in Boston. But on the morning of
October 17, the cannons on the decks of the squadron were aimed men-
acingly at the most populated portion of the town. Anxiety decreased,
however, when it became known that Captain Mowat was in command
of the vessels. Falmouth’s leaders, after all, had helped him gain his re-
lease from Thompson and his rebellious band. Townspeople assumed
that he could be reasoned with. Having stationed his vessels in the for-
mation he desired, Mowat sent an officer ashore to read the following
dictum to the people of Falmouth:
To The people of the Town of Falmouth:
After many premeditated attacks on the legal Prerogatives of the
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best of Sovereigns; After repeated Instances you have experienced in
Britain’s long forbearance of the Rod of Correction; and the Merciful
and Paternal extension of her Hands to embrace you, again and again
have been regarded as vain and nugatory: And in place of a dutiful and
grateful return to your King and Parent state, you have been guilty of the
most unpardonable Rebellion, Supported by the Ambition of a set of de-
signing men, whose insidious views have cruelly imposed on the
credulity of their fellow creatures, and at last have brought the whole
into the same Dilemma; which leads me to feel not a little for the Inno-
cent of them, in particular on the present occasion, having it in orders to
execute a just Punishment on the Town of Falmouth: In the name of
which Authority I previously warn you to remove without delay the Hu-
man Species out of the said town; for which purpose I give you the time
of two hours, at the period of which, a Red pendant will be hoisted at the
Main top gallant Masthead with a gun but should your imprudence lead
you to show the least resistance, you will in that case free me of that Hu-
manity, so strongly pointed out in my orders as well as my own Inclina-
tion. I also observe that all those who did upon a former occasion fly to
the King’s Ship under my Command for Protection, that the same door
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Henry Mowat gained infamy for his part in the bombardment of Falmouth in
October 1775. Acting on orders from the British Admiralty, he accused the in-
habitants of “most unpardonable Rebellion” and, after allowing time to “remove
without delay the Human Species,” launched a twelve-hour barrage that de-
stroyed 414 of the town’s 500 buildings. Maine Historical Society collections.
 
is now open and ready to receive them. The Officer who will deliver this
letter I respect to return unmolested.
I am & Ca
Henry Mowat14
Upon receiving Mowat’s notice, a committee of Falmouth citizens
rowed out to meet with the captain to discuss options. Mowat was not
authorized to bargain with locals or even to warn them of an imminent
attack. Perhaps, in the tradition of chivalrous conduct, he was willing to
risk the vice-admiral’s displeasure by attempting to find a way Falmouth
could avoid a bombardment. Mowat in fact did make an offer, but it was
hardly generous. He informed the committee that he would take it upon
himself to deviate from his orders by allowing the inhabitants of Fal-
mouth to leave the settlement before he opened fire. If the residents sur-
rendered all of their arms by the following morning and swore “alle-
giance to his Majesty King George the third,” the town could be
spared.15
When the committee revealed the details of Mowat’s ultimatum, an-
other panic ensued in the town. Children and the elderly were evacu-
ated, and many valuable possessions were removed to the safety of the
countryside. By daybreak, with many people hastily evacuating the
town, what was left of the militia assembled a small collection of arms
for Mowat’s inspection. It became obvious that the better muskets and
pistols had been hidden away for safekeeping. By securing these guns,
the residents of Falmouth assured themselves a catastrophe.
The local committee members attempted to stall the inevitable, but
they were summarily escorted under arms off the ship and rowed
ashore. At mid-morning Mowat had his vessels commence firing on Fal-
mouth’s concentration of largely wooden buildings. The small armada
bombarded the settlement throughout the morning, carrying out
Mowat’s threat to burn Falmouth to the ground. No lives were lost, but
hundreds of buildings were razed or ruined. Two of the thirteen mer-
chant ships trapped in port were seized by Mowat and the rest de-
stroyed. The Reverend Jacob Bailey, a dispirited Tory minister, wrote
about the local mood: “now in many instances [the people were] desti-
tute of a hut for themselves and families; and as a tedious winter was ap-
proaching they had before them a most gloomy and distressing
prospect.” Bailey reported that a “multitude of villains were purloining
... goods and carrying them into the country beyond the reach of jus-
tice.... The country people were hardly restrained from destroying those
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houses that had escaped the general devastation. A most surprising in-
stance of perfidious baseness and human cruelty.”16
Mowat’s bombardment was headline news in America, England, and
France. Although opinion was divided in Britain, some newspapers ex-
pressed regret and considered the assault an affront to justice. The peo-
ple of Falmouth were British citizens with all the rights of protection
from the crown, and such destruction seemed unwarranted by the
events that had preceded it. Many in the French press, always attentive to
unseemly events in North America, thought that Graves’ strategy was a
catastrophic military and political blunder. George Washington found
Graves’ strategy appalling and wrote of Mowat’s conduct: “I know not
how sufficiently to detest it.”17 The incident bolstered Falmouth’s resolve
to fight for American independence; the town committed men and
money to the war and petitioned Washington for assistance in rebuild-
ing its fortifications. On October 30, 1775, the Continental Congress
added two additional cruisers of twenty and thirty-six-guns to complete
a small navy then consisting of two merchant vessels, one of fourteen
guns and one of ten guns. In addition, the Congress issued a general
prize law authorizing the capture of all British vessels that were, in the
judgment of the ship’s captain, connected with the impending war. The
new policy “was produced by the depredations committed by the vessels
under the command of Captain Mowat.”18 The burning of Falmouth
also served to arouse separatist fervor elsewhere in the colonies. The im-
age of the inferno, like that of the Boston Massacre, helped sway many
formerly unconvinced by the revolutionary cause. Mowat’s actions
weakened Britain’s political position in Maine and contributed to the
outcome of the War of Independence. John Adams, who occasionally
visited Falmouth as a barrister, was saddened by the events in Maine and
became convinced that secession was inevitable.19 Samuel Adams, his
provocateur cousin, became even more zealous in his quest for inde-
pendence.
Shortly after the assault, Mowat was ordered to continue his survey
work along the Gulf of Maine from his base in Halifax. On April 4, 1776,
Graves ordered him to aid in converting a Philadelphia merchant ship,
the Rittenhouse, to a fourteen-gun sloop and to take command of the
newly named Albany.20 An item in the Boston Independent Chronicle
noted that “Capt. Burr, of the Milford died at Halifax lately, and the
Command of his Ship was given to the well known, brutal Henry
Mowat, who cruelly plundered and burnt Casco-Bay.”21 Mowat’s notori-
ety no doubt helped intimidate potential foes.
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Bagaduce
During the winter and spring of 1779, British vessels were particu-
larly active in combating the rebel harassment of their North American
trade and shipping. On June 9, the Admiralty’s headquarters at Halifax
ordered the occupation of Majabigwaduce, more commonly known
then as Bagaduce and today as Castine, a hammer-shaped peninsula lo-
cated near the mouth of the Penobscot River. The British landed the
74th and 82nd regiments on June 12, with a total of 640 men under the
command of Brigadier General Francis McLean. They set up camp on
the neck and began building a fort. In an attempt to gain the trust of lo-
cal loyalists, General McLean invited the inhabitants of Bagaduce to take
an oath of allegiance to the king. He noted that “the greater part of the
inhabitants on the river Penobscot, and the several islands therein, are
well affected to His Majesty’s person, and the ancient constitution under
which they formerly flourished.”22
Captain Mowat, still in command of the Albany, was put in charge
of the naval defense. He expected that the Americans would to try to
capture Bagaduce, and in consideration of the peninsula’s strategic and
economic value, regain control of the Penobscot River. After appraising
the situation, he determined that he needed two additional vessels and
asked General McLean to commandeer the North (fourteen-guns) and
the Nautilus (sixteen-guns), plus some transports, to help protect the
fort during its construction.
News of the British landing caused alarm in the colonial capital. The
General Court of Massachusetts considered this incursion a threat to the
state’s fisheries, coastal trade, and particularly the vital supply of old-
growth pines essential for ships’ masts. In late June the General Court
ordered its Board of War to engage as many armed vessels as could be
acquired on short notice and prepare to sail against the British at Baga-
duce as soon as possible. In addition, the General Court authorized the
Board of War to impress vessels and sailors, if need be, to supplement
the force, with the promise of fair compensation for all losses. The Mass-
achusetts seamen were guaranteed the same pay and allowances as those
under Continental service. Sensing the inadequacy of leadership in the
State Navy of Massachusetts, or perhaps as a calculated hedge to transfer
blame in the case of failure, the usually independent General Court ap-
pealed to the Eastern Department of Continental Navy Board for assis-
tance. The Board responded by placing three Continental ships, the
frigate Warren (thirty-two-guns), the sloop Providence (twelve-guns),
and brig Diligent (fourteen-guns), at the disposal of the state. Captain
Henry Mowat 
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In June 1779 a British force un-
der Brigadier General Francis
McLean occupied and fortified
the Bagaduce Peninsula on the
eastern shores of Penobscot Bay.
Captain Mowat and his ships
defended the fortifications from
the harbor.
As the Massachusetts expeditionary forces left Boston for Bagaduce, British
forces dug in on the peninsula, constructing a four-foot high rampart later
known as Fort George. This 1880s photo shows the remains of the fort and the
“dungeon.” Centennial of Castine (Castine Town Library, 1896).
 
Dudley Saltonstall, second in seniority on the list of Continental Navy
captains, would fly the broad pennant of commodore of the assembled
fleet. Saltonstall was the grandson of Gurdon Saltonstall, a former royal
governor of Connecticut and a founder of Yale College. His mother was
a Winthrop, a Massachusetts first family, and his wife was a member of
the influential Rhode Island Babcock family. A product of the American
colonial aristocracy, Saltonstall was extremely well connected.
The three Continental Navy vessels were short-handed, but the prof-
itable Massachusetts’s privateer fleet had a nearly full compliment of
sailors. In order to muster the seamen needed to crew the naval vessels,
Massachusetts authorities ordered a forty-day embargo on merchant
shipping. With trade options limited and the local economy crippled,
many privateer investors offered their ships to the state government.
Ever speculative, some Bostonians bought shares in privateer vessels, as-
suming that the success of the Penobscot Expedition was assured and
that they would receive a handsome return on their investment. Ship
owners who consented to loan their vessels to the cause of the common
good and display a modicum of patriotic zeal also found room for a
measure of Yankee discretion. They prudently had their vessels ap-
praised and fully insured by the state. In spite of patriotic appeals and
speculative deals among the citizenry, the Board of War was forced to
impress the privateers General Putnam, Hector, Black Prince, and Hunter
for a two-month “cruise” to the Penobscot.23 New Hampshire Governor
Mesech Weare contracted with the twenty-gun privateer Hampden to
join the task force when it sailed past Portsmouth.
The expeditionary ground forces were led by Massachusetts
Brigadier-Generals Solomon Lovell and Peleg Wadsworth and Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Paul Revere, who commanded the train of artillery. The
fleet consisted of between sixteen and eighteen armed vessels and
twenty-four transports, and the force carried, depending on the defini-
tion of armament, between 314 and 344 guns. The Continental Navy
Board instructed Saltonstall to “Captivate, Kill or destroy the Enemies
whole Force both by Sea & Land, & ... to Consult measures & preserve
the greatest harmony with the Commander of the Land Forces, that the
navy & army may Cooperate & assist each other.”24 Communications
between the overall commander and the subordinate commanders
would be necessary to accomplish the mission.
The expedition embarked from Boston on July 19 and arrived off
Bagaduce on July 25, after picking up a large contingent of militia from
Townsend (Boothbay). Before moving his fleet into Penobscot Bay,
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Saltonstall sent a scouting party ahead to determine the position of the
British vessels protecting the new fort. Keeping such a sizeable undertak-
ing as the Penobscot Expedition secret with so many Tories about was
impossible.25 General McLean was informed of the expedition and sent
for reinforcements from New York. Meanwhile the general prepared a
four-foot high rampart later known as Fort George. Secondary cannon
batteries were placed on the southern shore of the Bagaduce peninsula
and on nearby Nautilus Island. Mowat moored his three armed sloops,
with their total of fifty-six guns, close together at the western entrance of
the harbor, and had his small transports huddle behind them for protec-
tion. The transports could be easily turned into gun boats or fire ships or
cut adrift as navigational hazards.
Upon his arrival at Bagaduce, Saltonstall deployed nine of his vessels
against the line of three British ships.26 The result was an ineffective ex-
change of fire lasting more than an hour. Saltonstall then ordered his
ships to anchor out of cannon range, signaling to the enemy that the
commodore was reluctant to risk damage to his vessels. At dusk the
Americans attempted to establish a beachhead on Bagaduce. Faced with
this amphibious operation, the defenders were forced to spread their
troops in scattered bunkers, since they did not know the direction of the
assault. The attackers maintained the advantage of concentrating forces
at defensive weak points. At the same time, their ship-based artillery was
less vulnerable to stationary cannons firing from forts. The wild card
was nature. Faced with strong winds and tidal currents, the Americans
aborted the landing because they feared stranding men on the beach.
On July 26 about 150 marines landed on Nautilus Island and drove
off the lightly entrenched British troops. From the captured island Re-
vere’s artillery train commanded a part of the British anchorage. In re-
sponse, Mowat moved his vessels about half a mile eastward into the in-
ner harbor at the mouth of the Bagaduce River, then arrayed them in a
line across the mouth of this inner harbor on spring cables, enabling
each to deliver a destructive broadside to advancing enemy ships. Most
of Saltonstall’s armed vessels were square rigged. They therefore re-
quired many minutes to tack or wear (change sailing directions), even
with ample sea room. The custom for sailing into combat with square-
sailed vessels was to have the sails on the lowest yard fastened aloft to
their yards in a battle-ready configuration. Unfortunately, the fewer the
sails a ship carried aloft, the slower the headway, thus compromising a
vessel’s maneuverability. If the Americans did manage to get close to
Mowat’s vessels, the wind and tide would likely make retreat maneuvers
impossible. This may account for Saltonstall’s often quoted and perhaps
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misinterpreted remark to his officers: “I am not going to risk my ship-
ping in that damned hole!”27
One tactic that Saltonstall did not try was to convert some trans-
ports into fire ships. The prevailing summer winds off Bagaduce are
westerly or southwesterly; the tides can often exceed ten feet, and sum-
mer fogs are common. Saltonstall’s fireboats could have moved quickly
under these conditions and would have presented a great hazard in the
small harbor. In addition, smoke from the burning fire ships might have
provided a screen for the advancing American ships. Shore-based can-
nons would have had difficulty finding targets in the smoky scrim.
British General McLean later said that after seeing the vast American
force assembled off the peninsula he was prepared to surrender, follow-
ing an obligatory token resistance, in order to save British lives. Conceiv-
ably a well-planned American assault would have produced this end.
On July 29 Mowat ordered most of his transports hauled ashore or scut-
tled. He converted one, the former privateer St. Helena, into a floating
gun platform by mounting six guns on the vessel and adding her to his
defense line. The rest of the guns from the transports were given to the
marines and soldiers manning the shore positions. Mowat ordered fifty
of his sailors to build a redoubt on shore outfitted with eight small naval
guns in order to assure a line of communications with the fort and Gen-
eral McLean.
The disastrous end of the expedition is well known. Saltonstall had
been reluctant to commit his ships in support of the militia’s amphibi-
ous invasion force. Without his cannons the ground troops were unable
to establish a foothold on the peninsula. Records of the expedition indi-
cate much squabbling between naval and army officers and privateers.
Finally, after an unproductive siege of nineteen days, the British vessels
Raisonable, Blonde, Virginia, Greyhound, Carmilla, Galatea, and the
sloop Otter, under the command of Admiral Sir George Collier, arrived
at the mouth of the Penobscot. Counting the cannons on Mowat’s ves-
sels, the British now had 266 guns, many larger than those of the Ameri-
cans. The British force drove the overwhelmed rebel fleet up the Penob-
scot River where the Americans were forced to burn or scuttle their
vessels. The crews made their way home through the dense down-east
forests. The Penobscot Expedition was the worst naval defeat of the Rev-
olutionary War and one of the worse in American history. Saltonstall
lost his commission in the Continental Navy as a result of the fiasco, and
Colonel Revere faced court martial for disobeying an order from Gen-
eral Wadsworth during the disorderly retreat from the Penobscot, but
was later acquitted.
Henry Mowat 
Mowat’s actions when the British reinforcements arrived are note-
worthy. His first order was to move the cannons that he had placed
ashore back on his ships. He then prepared to have his flotilla join the
chase up the river. Because there was a headwind and the tide had slack-
ened, he warped his vessels out of the harbor and into the Penobscot
River. This involved rowboats carrying kedge anchors out from the ves-
sels; the anchors were dropped, and the sailors winched up the cables,
Maine History
Mowatt’s skillful maneuvering and the difficulties of entering the small harbor
under adverse winds and tides held the Massachusetts armada at bay until
British reinforcements arrived from Halifax. The sketch above locates the Mass-
achusetts Navy outside the harbor and Mowat’s fleet in three different positions
in the harbor, along with the fort and redoubts on the shore. George A. Wheeler,
Castine Past and Present (1896).
thus slowly moving the ships behind them.28 It was obvious that his de-
fense of Bagaduce had succeeded, and Mowat desperately wanted to join
the fray. Once in the Penobscot, he put some of his sailors in small
armed boats that could be rowed in search of the enemy, demonstrating
his aggression in battle.
One incident, however, showed Mowat’s humane side. When the
British landed at the Bagaduce Peninsula, Captain John (Josiah) Brewer,
a member of the local Penobscot militia, realized that there was little to
be gained by resisting. Informed that the inhabitants would be allowed
to “stay in their homes and live peaceably and mind their business,” he
negotiated a military pass so that he might serve as an intermediary be-
tween the up-river settlements and the British.29 Once the American
ships had been burned, sunk, or captured, American wounded appeared
in settlements. Using his pass, Brewer contacted McLean and requested
safe passage for the sick and wounded. A small upriver schooner was
chartered and workers began converting it into a makeshift hospital ship
to accommodate the injured men. Mowat, on patrol for able-bodied
rebel survivors, became aware of the humanitarian rescue operation.
Bored with the relative routine of the patrol, he became interested in the
conversion of the schooner. He frequently invited Brewer aboard the Al-
bany where they discussed the progress over a glass of wine. When the
invalids were loaded onboard, Mowat issued a pass to Brewer to allow
him through the British blockade.30 Unfortunately, Mowat learned that
a noted rebel, Captain George Ross of the privateer Monmouth, had es-
caped among the sick and wounded using a false name. Furious at the
deception, Mowat threatened Brewer when they met after the incident.
The American admitted his guilt, and Mowat’s anger cooled. In combat,
a little subterfuge was considered permissible. In time the two adver-
saries resumed their cordial relationship.
After the defeat, the Americans lost heart in contesting the Penob-
scot, and for the rest of the war eastern Maine remained under British
occupation. British shipping, from Bagaduce to Newfoundland, enjoyed
a period of relative security. Evidence of this is contained in the follow-
ing note Mowat wrote sometime after the events of Bagaduce:
The attack on the Penobscot ... was positively the severest blow re-
ceived by the American naval force during the war. The trade to
Canada, which was intended, after the expected reduction of the post
of Penobscot, to be intercepted by this very armament, went safe that
season: The New England provinces did not for the remaining period
of the contest recover the loss of ships, and the expense of fitting out
Henry Mowat 
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the expedition. Every thought of attempting Canada and Nova Scotia,
was henceforth laid aside, and the trade ... from the banks of New-
foundland along the coast of Nova Scotia ... enjoyed unusual secu-
rity..31
Mowat’s triumph at Bagaduce gained him little, professionally. Admiral
Collier neglected to mention Mowat’s exemplary actions to the Admi-
ralty in London. Mowat had hoped for a swift rise in rank, but every
promotion made by Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, Collier’s successor as
commander of British Naval Forces in North America, went to officers
junior to him. Particularly rankling was Arbuthnot’s promotion of an
officer who had received his lieutenant’s commission while serving un-
der Mowat on the Albany. On October 26, 1782, Mowat was promoted
to the rank of captain at the relatively advanced age of forty-eight. He
rose to become senior officer in command of the fleet on the North
American station. After serving for about forty-five years, the sixty-four-
year-old British naval officer died of a stroke on April 4, 1798 on board
his ship, the Assistance, five miles off Cape Henry. By that time better re-
lations had evolved between Great Britain and her former colonies.
Henry Mowat is still with us in America, interred at in the St. John’s
churchyard in Hampton, Virginia.
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In mid-August the American commanders resolved to launch an assault on Fort
George; almost at the same moment the British relief fleet arrived from Halifax.
The resulting defeat was the worst naval disaster in American history prior to
Pearl Harbor. Maine Historical Society Collections.
 
Little is known of Mowat’s personal character, but he did deviate
from his orders in a humanitarian gesture before bombarding Fal-
mouth. His interest in the hospital schooner and its errand of mercy and
his treatment of Colonel Brewer also suggest that he was not as heartless
or brutal as his reputation suggests. As the ranking naval officer in the
waters off the Maine coast, Mowat was duty-bound to carry out dracon-
ian orders under difficult and rapidly shifting conditions, as Britain and
America moved steadily toward war. Caught between a frustrated and
peremptory Admiralty and a rebellious colonial population, he made
difficult choices. These decisions tainted his reputation in Maine, and
they may have slowed his advance up the ranks in the British Navy, but
the documents provide no evidence that he could have done otherwise
in this deteriorating situation. Perhaps Mowat was not as heartless as he
is presently described in Maine history; more than a miscreant, he is,
perhaps, best considered a man of mystery.
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